

#### Introduction to this document

### The war in Ukraine is above all a political and humanitarian crisis...

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a serious **humanitarian crisis**. BCG condemns this attack and the violence that is killing, wounding, and displacing so many people.

The top priority in moments like these must be the **safety and security of people**. Corporates, governments, and non-for-profit organizations should focus on supporting the people in Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and globally affected (physically and mentally).

It is the duty of political, societal, and business leaders to navigate through this crisis. **The intent of this document is to inform discussions on the energy impact of the war in Ukraine.** 

The situation surrounding Ukraine is dynamic and rapidly evolving - this document reflects information and analysis as of **17 March 2022.** It is not intended as a prediction of future events and is shared only as a resource for BCG and client conversations.



#### **ENERGY IMPACT**

Global energy supplies were already limited before Russia invaded Ukraine. Now, sanctions on Russia—a leading exporter of natural gas, oil, and coal—and uncertainty over the risks ahead are throwing energy markets into greater turmoil. Many buyers and traders are unwilling to deal in Russian oil due to the risks. Major energy producers are pulling out of Russia altogether. The invasion is already raising energy costs for consumers and industries such as steel, chemicals, and transportation. The second-order effects—on supply chains, consumer prices, agriculture, and beyond—will likely intensify.

Many energy importers are trying to reduce their reliance on Russia. But that transition will be challenging. Europe, which depends heavily on Russian natural gas, plans to reduce its consumption of Russian gas by two-thirds by the end of 2023. But its current gas reserves are at historic lows. Supplies of non-Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) are tight, and the infrastructure needed to transport it is insufficient. Even if timelines for adding new wind, solar, and nuclear capacity on the continent accelerate, it will take years for this capacity to come online.

As they seek to mitigate the immediate fallout, companies must review their energy-supply footprints and investments. They may also need to rethink their strategies for the transition from fossil fuels. Governments will need to reassess their energy security and climate goals.




Deep-dive: First view of impact on Energy


- > Context and current situation
- > Impact on energy supply
- > Implications: consumers, companies & governments

### Prior to the war, global energy already "tight" with inflationary pressures

#### **Strong demand recovery from COVID began in 2020**



#### Inventories substantially below pre-COVID levels




#### **Insufficient investment: reducing capex in last 5y**





### Russia plays important role in global energy, the war heightens supply risks





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
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
# Pricing - Oil | Significant crude and oil volatility, with the market pricing in risk of long-term disruption of Russian flows

#### **Disruptions to Russian Energy sector...**

- Geopolitical risk: uncertainties around the evolution of the conflict
- 2 **Liquidity pressure** due to sanctions on Russia increases hedging and margin calls
- Unwillingness of most buyers & traders to take Russian oil given supply chain risks
- 4 **Reputational risk** prompting major oil producers to exit/reduce Russia exposure

#### ...has caused global volatility across oil markers and relative premiums






# Pricing - Gas | Low European storage levels forcing a response to ensure security of supply, markets pricing in future risk of disruption



Historically-low gas inventories in Europe, with the EU considering imposing forced filling requirements...


European gas storage utilization (%)



EU's consideration of **90%+ storage filling requirement** to create **immediate buying pressure** 

Europe and Asia


... leading to surges in prices in Europe, with Asian LNG<sup>1</sup> prices closely following (competing to secure supply)



Currently spikes are not rooted in adverse supply impacts, but instead **driven by need to increase/buffer inventories** 

#### Full shutdown of Russian oil exports unlikely given high risk...


Global Scenarios for Oil & Liquids Production, QBtu1



Shutdown would risk **large global supply shock**, price surges & demand destruction – thus risk of **leakage of Russian** crude to market

#### ...and years-long 'energy transition' project timelines

Indicative timeline range (<u>number of years for new mid-sized projects in each energy transition/renewables capacity area</u>)<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1.</sup> Quadrillion British thermal units (the amount of energy required to raise one pound of water one degree Fahrenheit); Notes: Scenarios include BP, Shell, and IEA; 2. Timeline ranges are based on pre-Ukraine estimations for new projects (not projects where work is under way). 3. Average total timeline is indicative average based on average-size projects in the space. Time can vary based on scale and scope; 4. Potential shorter timelines assumes speeding up of planning, permitting and financing stages, yet execution stage of these projects unlikely to be able to be reduced significantly; Sources: Wood and Mackenzie, Feb 2022; Resources for the Future Global Energy Outlook; Kpler; Refinitiv Eikon

# Supply shock – Gas | EU reliance on Russian gas increases its vulnerability, fueling an accelerated push for alternatives



### RePowerEU: EU have launched plans to reduce Russian gas import dependence

66%

target reduction in Russian natural gas supply by end of 2023


Requires strong coordination to realize, given risks (e.g., intense competition for LNG from Asia, pace of Net-Zero transition)

90%

Long-term reduction target of gas consumption requires front-loading of already aggressive plans

#### Target levers for reduction of Russian gas dependence

Billion cubic meters equivalent



## Supply-shock - Gas Market | EU plans technically possible, but challenging to realize in the available time horizon

#### **Supply Risks**



#### **Renewable Energy bottlenecks**

Growth in renewable development will create supply-chain pressure & risk of worse inflation

Further, \$700+ bn financing required for renewable energy plan



#### LNG market is already tight

Competitive pricing between EU & APAC for LNG Higher logistics costs, as LNG supply will most likely come from the US and Qatar





#### **Demand increase – winter risk**

Current plans based on "normal" winter seasons, not considering risks of colder winter and higher energy demand



### France nuclear capacity and utilization constraints

EU plans rely on French capacity at/above current level. However, no capacity step change is expected till 2030s



#### Transmission system operators' risks

Difficulty for oil and gas transport network to fully accommodate growth demand without risking its integrity



#### Financing across gas purchases

\$90bn required to fill gas storages this year



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# Energy market pricing and supply shocks make products more expensive to produce and buy, as governments seek to improve energy security



#### **Consumers**

Energy is outsized driver of inflation currently: 7% of CPI<sup>1</sup> yet account for 24% of inflation<sup>2</sup>

Rising energy prices reducing discretionary spend

**Subsidies** increasingly likely, where not already in place



#### Companies

**High energy-intensity** industries (e.g., steel, cement, chemicals, fertilizers, travel, freight) experience cost increases presenting risk to profitability

Businesses **assessing impact** and ensuring continuity of business-critical operations

**Mid-to-long-term,** likely positive impact on climate goals – yet need to de-average impact by country



#### Governments

#### **Extend of government actions vary**

- focus on energy security (esp. EU)


Emphasis on reducing price pressures, stockpiling, diversifying energy supply

Will impact **speed of transition to renewables** – impact varied by country



# Consumers | High energy prices impacting total demand - but governments likely to support consumers and small businesses

#### Higher oil & gas prices impacting consumer demand



#### Consumers likely to **reduce discretionary spend**:

- 30% say rising gas will greatly affect their decision to travel<sup>1</sup>
- 59% likely to change lifestyle if gasoline price rises by ~20%<sup>2</sup>

#### **Governments responding with direct subsidies**



- €0.17 per liter reduction in tax on fuel
- €0.11 per liter of diesel from April 1
- Value added tax on electricity cut from 21% to 9% from July 1



- Expected to unveil full measures
- Mandated EDF to only adjust tariffs by 4%
- Already spent €20bn to moderate gas and power costs



- Proposals of a "crisis discount" (fuel subsidy)
- If approved, gas prices cut €0.20+ per liter



 Imposed prices caps on some basic foods, fuel and mortgages, extending a cap already in place on household energy



 Several states considering reducing or suspending gas tax – bills already proposed and are being voted on soon

Second-order impact

# Companies | High energy-intensity industries will experience the largest cost impact



#### Steel

Higher costs in energy will increase steel prices

**Energy represents 10-20% of total costs in steel** production in EU (varies by region and year) <sup>1</sup>



#### **Chemicals & fertilizers**

Ammonia - for which **72-85% of cost is natural gas<sup>3</sup>**— and other chemicals are critical for production — already significant price increases



#### Cement

Higher costs in energy will increase cement prices

Energy is **10-30% of total cement costs**, depending on region and year<sup>4</sup>



#### Air Travel & Freight

**Jet fuel prices up 27%** month over month<sup>5</sup>, likely to drive cargo rates up

Airspace closures leading to fewer, longer (more fuel consuming) flights



#### **Shipping Freight**

**Bunker (marine fuel) up 84%** vs. last year<sup>6</sup> where fuel represents ~**45% of total cost** for shipping

**Further cost increases** due to delays (lane closures, & reshuffling of trade flows)



Construction, auto, rail, shipbuilding, machinery, metal, equipment impact

Global food supplies, chemical factories, auto, etc. will be negatively impacted by input prices & less supply Construction and infrastructure impacted

Logistics and consumer travel cost impacted

**Shifts in air networks** to optimize aircraft utilization as travel spending reduce



affected, especially long-haul freight<sup>7</sup>

Route re-configurations for capacity optimization

Further inflationary pressures, erosion of margins & conservative capex are likely as energy prices remain high



# Companies | Assess first- and second-order impact, devise mitigation plans and build resilience in the mid term

#### **Short-term** Mid-to-long-term Assess exposure and risks to **Assess second-order impact for** Review climate goals, assess input costs, ensure operational your customers. Prioritize impact, develop a mitigation plan business continuity impacted customers and develop by country – as governments differentiated mitigations plans accelerate or decelerate transition Partner closely across value **Understand investment shifts Build agility in scenario chain** to improve transparency. and capital implications (e.g. planning to assess similar Assess reputational & operational **RePowerEU**) in your industry – external shocks and their impact

balance planning and flexibility


(e.g., network level 'digital twins')

impact (incl. suppliers of suppliers)



# Governments | Key levers should be utilized to respond to energy crisis based on individual nation's position

#### Governments exposed to risk differently...



#### ... and response highly dependent on country's position

More heavily reliant on Russia More susceptible to supply shocks and market volatility

#### **Potential steps:**

- Stockpiling energy resources
- Identifying new short-term suppliers (e.g., LNG from US)
- Potential delay of coal & nuclear power decommissioning
- Investing in renewables for longer term independence

Less reliant on Russia Less susceptible to supply shocks; equally to price increases

#### **Potential steps:**

- Implement short-term fiscal stimulus, subsidies, price caps
- Invest in renewables for longer term price reduction and support of other less advanced countries in the space

Reducing regulatory hurdles, permitting periods, legal procedures needed to increase speed of supply increases

# Governments | EU and key member-states are implementing concrete policies to reduce short-term and long-term dependence on Russia

#### **Short-term**

#### Mid-to-long-term



### Implement fiscal stimulus & price caps

Enact short-term measures (subsidies, tax cuts) to shelter vulnerable electricity consumers



### Diversify & increase energy supply

Enact minimum gas storage obligations

Identify alternative sources

Maximize generation from lowemissions sources: e.g., bioenergy

Stockpile energy resources



### Increase efficiency, reduce demand

Accelerate energy efficiency in industry and in heating pumps

Encourage a temporary thermostat lowering and highway slowdowns – to reduce energy usage



### Expand renewable capacity

Accelerate the deployment of new renewable projects

Step up efforts to diversify and decarbonize sources of power system

Enable renewables for energy independence



Capped energy bill price increases to 4%, significantly under market



Increasing gas imports from Algeria and Azerbaijan and increasing use of LNG terminals



RePowerEU advised turning down thermostats 1°C to reduce electricity demand



Plans to expand renewable capacity & legislate full supply from renewables by 2035

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